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最近對於軍事史的發展挺有興趣的,於是陸續看了些書,其中看到一篇由英國著名軍事家
Michael Howard所撰寫的一篇短文,覺得蠻有趣、蠻有同感的,對身處台灣的我們來說也
許是個不錯的省思與啟發。由於老人家他的文筆相當幽默諷刺,但由於自己能力有限,僅
能憑著破爛的高中英文,在翻譯上盡量採微言大義,讓版上的大家見醜了。可以的話還是
建議看原文,如果有哪裡翻譯的不好或有誤解之處也請大家多多指教。
原文有些長,因此我將它分成數篇。
轉載請先經過本人同意
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Military History and the history of war
by/ Michael Howard
* Michael Howard (1922-): 英國跨學科進行戰爭研究的奠基人,在倫敦大學國王學院
創立了著名的李德哈特檔案館,現為英國國際戰略研究所(IISS)的榮譽教授與創辦者之
一,其以在軍事史傑出的貢獻而在2005年由伊莉莎白女王頒贈功績勳章(Order of Merit
)。
** 本文收錄自美國軍事史家E. Williamson Murray所編著之"The Past as Prologue:
The Importance of History to the Military Profession"第二章。
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When the first university chair in our subject was established at Oxford in the first decade of the twentieth century, its field was defined simply as "Military History," and it took two world war s to broaden this to the "History of War." I have no firm evidence for this, but I suspect that the
change was made to make it clear that the incumbent was expected to cover naval and air matters as well.
當牛津大學在1910年代建立我們這領域內的第一個大學講座時,它僅僅被定義為"軍事史"範疇,一直要到經歷了兩次大戰以後,它才逐漸發展成"戰爭史"。儘管我沒有辦法證實,但我猜想這個轉變主要是想要將海軍與空軍納入此一範疇。
The same enlargement occurred in the scope of the only other similar chair in this country, which was established after the First World War at King's College London for Lloyd George's nemesis, General Sir Frederick Maurice, and about this I can speak with greater authority. The people responsible for reviving it after the Second World War were not military men: they were
academics in the University of London who had been involved in the civilian conduct of the war – economists like Lionel Robbins, social historians like Sir Keith Hancock, diplomatic specialists like Sir Charles Webster. They knew from personal experience that the conduct of war was too serious a business to be left to the generals and believed in consequence that the study of war was too important to be left to military historians. The scope that they had in mind was so wide that they were not sure how to define it.
同樣的轉變也發生在倫敦大學的國王學院,它在一次大戰以後亦由勞合喬治的政治勁敵腓特烈.莫里斯爵士建立了一個軍事研究講座。對於這件事,我想我有資格可以說,當年那些在二次大戰後負責復甦這個學科的人都不是軍人出身,這些人多半是倫敦大學的學者,包括經濟學家Lionel Robbins、社會史家Sir Keith Hancock與外交官查爾斯.韋伯斯特爵士。他們根據各自領域的經驗得出戰爭是一個相當嚴肅的事情,而這使得它將無法只靠軍事將領或軍事史家們來研究。然而他們所想像的戰爭研究,其所涵蓋的範圍卻又廣到難以被定義。
I recall a meeting of the great and the good in the early 1950s, where the title of the chair was being debated. Because its subject matter was not confined to history, they adopted that usefully vague term “studies”; one that was then in its infancy and today provides cover for innumerable soggy nonsubjects. But how were these “studies” to be defined? If they were not “military,” what were they? “Defense Studies” was deemed too mealy mouthed. Strategic Studies“ was too narrow. “Conflict Studies” was too broad. One learned scholar suggested, in desperation, “Polemological Studies.”At last Sir Charles Webster, a blunt and massive Yorkshireman, hit the table with a fist the size of a large ham and demanded : “It’s about war isn’t it? So what’s wrong with War Studies?”
這讓我想起當時發生在1950年代的那場爭論,究竟這個講座要掛上甚麼樣的頭銜?由於其
所涵蓋的並不是只有歷史學領域,是以無法和其他講座一樣以某某史講座稱之,因此最後
索性用一個更籠統的字眼來替代:"某某研究"。
然而這樣的研究到底要"研究"些甚麼呢?除了軍事史外還能是甚麼?若叫它防衛研究
似乎有些欲蓋彌彰的感覺,只稱之為戰略研究的話又有些太狹隘了,但叫他衝突研究卻又
太空泛了。甚至有學者絕望的建議:「何不叫戰爭和平學研究呢?」(編按:Polemology
是一個1930年代才出現的新詞,源自於希臘文戰爭之意,用來泛指那些為了防制國與國之
間的戰爭與廢除軍事武力而進行的研究,戰爭和平學這一定義與翻譯是出自復興崗學報的
莫大華副教授。)
這個討論最後是以查爾斯.韋伯斯特爵士,一個直率的約克郡佬,用他的拳頭重擊桌子做
結:「反正它和戰爭有關對吧?那為什麼不叫戰爭研究就好了?」
So, War Studies it became and has remained ever since. I was put in to hold the fort until they could find someone more eminent to occupy the chair (which I am glad to say they never did), and they genially made it clear to me that there were no limits to the claims I might stake out. I myself might teach the history of war, which was all I knew about, but I was to recruit as widely as possible among other disciplines: international relations, naturally; strategic studies, a subject whose birth had just been precipitated by the invention of nuclear weapons; economics, and the social sciences in general; law, both international and constitutional; anthropology; theology – indeed anything that I could think of and whose practitioners I could interest. If black studies, gender studies, gay studies, or media studies had then existed, I would certainly have colonized them as well. In short, I laid the foundation for that vast empire over which Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman now presides on both banks of the Thames.
這就是至今仍在使用的"戰爭研究"一詞的由來。直到他們找到更合適的人選之前,我暫時接下這個講座職位(而我很慶幸他們從沒找到這樣的人選)。雖然他們很和藹地說我可以依照自己的想法來決定講座的內容,然而由於我自己是教戰爭史的,所以我恐怕也只能教這個。但我是還到處去找了各種可能派上用場的學科:國際關係(不意外)、戰略研究(某個因核武突然出現而產生的學科)、經濟學與社會科學、法律(包括國際法與憲法等)、乃至於人類學與神學,幾乎涵蓋我所有能想得到會派得上用場的領域。我這麼說吧,如果當時有所謂黑人研究、性別研究、同性戀研究甚或媒體研究的話,我想我毫無疑問地也會把它們通通抓進來。總而言之,我替勞倫斯.佛里德曼爵士今天在泰晤士河兩岸所主持的事奠定了基礎。(編按:佛里德曼是現任倫敦大學國王學院戰爭研究的教授,同時也在伊拉克戰爭期間擔任英國首相布萊爾的外交政策顧問)
I am myself always a little uneasy when described as a “military historian.” Until very recently, the great majority of professional historians found it hard to think of the term in anything but a rather pejorative sense: “ military history is to history,” as I think someone once said, “what
military music is to music.” To dismiss it in this way is of course grossly unfair, but for doing so I think there have been two good reasons. “Military history” was equated with “operational history, ” and most of it – at lest, before the twentieth century – was written, and studied, to enable soldiers to be better at their jobs. This was and remains a quite legitimate function. Past wars provide the only database from which the military learn how to conduct their profession: how to do it and even more important, how not to do it.
就我個人而言,每當有人叫我"軍事史學家"時,我總是感到不太自在。因為直到目前為止,絕大部分的專業歷史學者都對其存有一種輕蔑的看法:「軍事史已經成為歷史了」就像某人曾經說過的一樣:「軍樂就是軍樂之於音樂。」(編按:這是美國喜劇的一個諺語:Military justice is to justice as military music is to music,軍法之於司法猶如軍樂之於軍樂,換言之就是廢話,是用來諷刺強詞奪理的軍事官方說詞)
這樣的評論自然不太公平,但我想他們也有理由如此。第一,軍事史幾乎被等同於軍事作
戰史,而且至少在二十世紀以前,書寫或研究軍事史只是為了讓軍人能夠更好的肩負他們
的任務,因為過往的戰爭經驗往往是他們學習的唯一管道。
Good, accurate military history serves a necessary purpose so long as we have a military profession at all. Clausewitz warned of the misuse of military history, of expecting it to provide “school solutions” rather than to educate the minds of the military commander to expect the unexpected, but his warning have all too often been ignored. One does not, or anyhow should not, study the past in order to discover the “school solutions” – that is the first “lesson” that professional historians have to drum into the heads of their pupils. Nevertheless, however intelligently it may be studies, military history has preserved for many of its readers and writers a distinct didactic purpose to which few other branches of historical studies would lay claim and one which they regard with understandable suspicion.
只要我們還需要軍事領域的專業,那麼一個優秀且清楚的軍事史便是不可或缺的。儘管克勞賽維茨曾經警示過我們,軍事史並不能提供標準答案,它只是讓那些軍事指揮官們能夠對那些預料之外的事情先做心理準備。要想成為一個專業的歷史學家,則所要學的第一個課題,便是反覆告誡自己不要從過往的歷史中尋求標準答案。然而對許多讀者和作者而言,軍事史仍舊提供了一個明顯有別於其他歷史學取向的研究,因為其他的歷史學派往往對軍事史抱持著懷疑的眼光而不願意關注這個領域。
The second characteristic of much – indeed I would say most –military history is its parochialism. It has all too often been written to create and embellish a national myth, and to promote deeds of derring – do among the young. I would like to be able to say that this is a characteristic that military historians have now outgrown, but we have only to stop into any bookshop to see that this would not be true. Leaving earlier history aside, the First World War in British historiography focuses almost exclusively on the British Army’s heroic sufferings and achievements on the Western Front. The Second World War is ransacked to provide material for the glorification of our past, while shelves are still being filled with scrapings from barrel
bottoms about the Gulf and Falklands Wars.
第二個讓軍事史不被主流專業歷史學所認可的理由,也是我認為最關鍵的原因,便是軍事史的眼界太過狹隘。軍事史太常落入粉飾國家神話與宣揚英雄式行徑的窠臼,我倒很希望自己能夠說:「今日的軍事史家們早已經成熟到不再有這種特質了」,然而每當我走進任一家書,我便不得不打消這個念頭:英國的軍事史對於第一次世界大戰的詮釋總是離不開西線那些英雄般的苦難與成就,而二次大戰的書則充斥著歌頌過去的題材。較早期的歷史被無視,而架上殘留的空間則被波斯灣與福克蘭群島戰爭的碎屑所填滿。
Heaven know that we are not the only ones to be parochial: American military historians, with a few brilliant exceptions like Carlo d’Este, seem unaware that the United States had any allies in the Second World War at all, in either Europe or the Pacific, and I doubt whether the Russians are any less oblivious either, although they have better reasons. No wonder bookshops have special sections on “military history” carefully quarantined from history proper. Some of my colleagues refer to it as “pornography”: This is going a bit far, but I understand what they mean.
天知道我們並不是唯一如此狹隘看待軍事史的國家,美國的軍事史學者,除了極少數像Carlo d' Este這般優秀的史學家以外,多半忘記美國無論在歐洲戰場或是太平洋戰場都還有其他盟友存在的事實。我敢說俄國的軍事史也有同樣的狀況,只是他們的理由比較充分一些。無怪乎書店總是會有一個特別的"軍事史"書籍專區,小心翼翼的將它與正統歷史學給區隔開來。我有些同事甚至認為軍事史猶如一種"色情文學"(自溺自慰用)。這也許說得太超過了些,但我可以理解為什麼。